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Abstract
The present paper analyses how resource rents may aﬀect political
outcomes in a polarized society, where groups hold conflicting views
on economic policy. A politically dominant group decides whether or
not to include the opposition in the national political process. The
weaker group chooses whether to remain in the union or secede. The
analysis finds that the eﬀect of resource rents on social and political
outcomes depends on the social environment, in particular the degree
of polarization in society. Moreover, the study shows that this re-
lationship may be non-monotonic, with increases in resource wealth
stimulating peaceful cooperation for some initial levels of wealth, and
stimulating conflict and division for other initial levels of wealth.
JEL codes: H77; O13; Q34
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1 Introduction
Is natural resource wealth a source of economic growth or economic stag-
nation, a source of peace or conflict, democracy or dictatorship? It is fair
to say that the emphasis lately, at least amongst economists, has been on
∗I would like to thank James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik for inspiring discussion
and valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
the negative eﬀects of resource wealth on economic, social and political out-
comes. In particular, “point source” resources like oil and lootable resources
like diamonds are found to have destructive eﬀects on society.1 But clearly,
natural resources do not necessarily lead to economic, social, and political
decay. For instance, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2005) demonstrate that
natural resources only applies for countries where the quality of institutions
is suﬃciently poor. Similarly, economic historians have traditionally empha-
sized the importance of natural resources as a positive factor in promoting
industrialization and economic growth.2 A number of regression analyses
and case studies also indicate that natural resources may stimulate cooper-
ation between groups in society.3 Based on a collection of case studies on
natural resources and conflict, Ross (2003b), concludes that “resource wealth
prolonged eight conflicts, shortened two, had a mixed eﬀect in two and no
impact in one.” (page 27-28)
In sum, the evidence from cross-country regression analysis and in depth
country studies demonstrates that resource rents may aﬀect political and so-
cial development through various channels, and that their net eﬀect on war
and peace, democracy and dictatorship, is far from clear. The present paper
is an eﬀort to think in a systematic way about at least some aspects of this
complexity. The model will demonstrate that resource rents have the poten-
tial to both stimulate and obstruct cooperation between social groups, and
specify under which circumstances diﬀerent political outcomes are likely to
apply. The model allows natural resources to both “fuel conflict”, “grease
the machinery of cooperation”, and “cause political pacification”, mecha-
nisms that have been identified in the empirical literature as potentially im-
portant. Key variables determining which eﬀect dominates include the level
of resource rents, its geographical distribution, and the degree of preference
polarization across interest groups.
The potential non-monotonic eﬀect of natural resource wealth on the po-
litical equilibrium sets this paper apart from the existing theoretical contribu-
tions on this topic. One relevant example is Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier
(2004), who analyze the survival ability of a kleptocracy. Focusing on the
1See Sachs and Warner (2001), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), Ross (2001, 2004), Lam
and Wantchekon (2002), Damania and Bulte (2003), Busby et al (2003), de Soysa (2002),
and Fearon and Laitin (2003).
2See for instance Wrigley (1998) and Walker (2001).
3See Smith (2004) and Herb (2005). For overviews on the positions of “resource opti-
mists” and “resource pessimists”, see de Soysa (2005) and Gleditsch (2001).
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ability of opposition groups to coordinate on attempts to overthrow the dic-
tator, they show that resource rents and foreign aid, by increasing the ability
to implement policies of divide-and-rule, may increase the longevity of such
regimes. In contrast, the present model demonstrates that such resources
may in fact stimulate political inclusion of the opposition, and specifies the
conditions for when this is likely to take place.
Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) study the eﬀect of resource revenues
on political competition and economic eﬃciency within a given political sys-
tem. In particular, they show how temporary and permanent oil booms may
aﬀect ineﬃcient distribution of rents in the form of public sector patronage
employment. The present paper diﬀers from theirs primarily by focusing on
political outcomes, and in particular the way in which resources and polar-
ization of preferences interact to determine transitions between dictatorship
and democracy.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2005) present a model where an altruistic party that
favors the supply of public goods competes against a patronage party that
oﬀers special favors to influential groups. A resource rent increases the like-
lihood that the patronage party wins the election and increases the scope for
patronage policies, and thus reduces the provision of public goods. In the
empirical part of their paper, they find that in developing countries, the com-
bination of resource wealth and democracy leads to low growth. In resource
poor countries, democracy outperforms autocracy, whereas in resource rich
countries, autocracy outperforms democracy. While the theoretical analysis
in their paper focuses on the economic consequences of resources, the present
paper studies focuses on political and social consequences.
Aslaksen and Torvik (2006) analyze a situation where two equal parties
choose between democratic competition or conflict. Democratic competition
is less costly than armed conflict. However, a democratic victory also brings
less freedom to define policies and hence lower gains to the winning party
than victory through conflict. The present analysis diﬀers from their paper
by analyzing the choice of an incumbent government on whether to include
the opposition in the political process or not. Hence, our starting point is
one of asymmetry in power between the groups. Moreover, conflict takes the
form of secession from a political union rather than war.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 analyses political transition, focusing on resource rents and preference
polarization as explanatory variables. Section 4 presents some insights from
case studies that illustrate the mechanisms highlighted in the model. Section
3
5 extends the model by allowing for policy commitment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
There are two groups of people in the country, group a and b. The groups
are of equal size, the mass of each group measured by unity. Each individual
is endowed with wealth, which we shall refer to as land, the value of which
we normalize to unity. Government expenditures are financed by a tax ti on
land together with revenues ρ from a point source natural resource, which
we refer to as oil.
The groups diﬀer on three dimensions. First, they are geographically
segregated, with groupa living in region A and group b in region B. Second,
they have conflicting views on what the optimal policy should be. Third, one
of the groups (group a) is politically dominant, for instance because of an
incumbency advantage and/or because of close connections to the military.4
The sequence of moves is as follows: First, the dominant group determines
whether or not to allow democratic elections at the national level. Second,
the weaker group decides whether to stay in the union or to seek regional
autonomy in its home region B. The “exit” option of the weaker group limits
the strength of the dominant group. Third, national elections, if oﬀered, are
held. Fourth, policies are implemented and payoﬀs are realized.
I shall identify secession with conflict, and national unity with peace.
According to this definition, there are four possible outcomes in the present
analysis, two peaceful and two involving conflict. The first peaceful out-
come is “inclusion”, where the stronger group includes the weaker group in
the political process at the national level, by opening up for elections, and
the weaker group chooses to take part in this process. The second peaceful
outcome is “compliance”, where the weaker group is not oﬀered political par-
ticipation, but still prefers to stay in the union, rather than to secede. The
two conflict outcomes diﬀer according to which group initiates the conflict.
First, there is “exit”, where the weaker group prefers to secede even when
oﬀered political participation by the stronger group. Second, there is “exclu-
4The asymmetry in political power is in line with Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), who
analyze the interaction between a rich elite and a poor opposition. The elite may try to
prevent revolution by oﬀering redistributive policies. If this is not enough, the elite may
oﬀer a promise of democratization, which can be seen as a credible commitment to future
redistribution.
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sion”, where the weaker group is excluded from political participation by the
stronger group, and responds by seeking regional autonomy. The stronger
group naturally dislikes the exit response by group b since it reduces the tax
base under its control. Hence, regional autonomy will be associated with
conflict.
There are eﬃciency gains from national unity, which can be interpreted
as a peace dividend. By choosing national unity, the groups avoid the costly
duplication of the public good associated with regional autonomy. This is the
only cost of conflict in the present model. Other costs of conflict, including
loss of lives, output and capital, are therefore not modelled explicitly. As
will become clear, the size of the peace dividend is a falling function of the
degree of polarization in society.
Since there are eﬃciency gains from cooperation, the Coase theorem im-
plies that the groups should be able to negotiate sharing rules so that conflict
never would arise in equilibrium. The reason why conflict may arise in the
present analysis is that groups are assumed to be unable to commit to re-
distributive fiscal policies. When in power each group would like to (and
therefore will) implement its preferred fiscal expenditure program and tax
the other group as hard as possible.5 In this environment, oﬀering democratic
elections can be seen as a credible commitment to redistribution on the part
of the stronger group. In case of election victory, the weaker group will be
able to implement its preferred policies. With the two groups being of equal
size, the probability of victory in democratic elections is fifty percent. How-
ever, I shall assume that ability of the stronger group to commit to free and
fair elections is less than perfect. The stronger group has an incumbency ad-
vantage, and can use its influence over the media, courts, military, police etc.
to bias the election campaign and count of votes in its favor. The probability
of the weaker group winning the election, at least as perceived by the weaker
group, is therefore less than fifty percent. The inability to commit to policies
and the inability to commit to free and fair elections together constrain the
ability of redistribution. Given these limitations to redistribution, the Coase
theorem does not necessarily apply, and conflict may arise in equilibrium.
The government collects taxes and determines the public expenditure
program. The utility function guiding policy choice is given by the product
of private goods consumption (1 − ti) and the utility derived from public
5An extension to the basic model also opens up for the possibility of redistribution
through (a limited degree of) commitment on public goods supply, see Section 5.
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goods (ui (gi)):
Ui = (1− ti)ui (gi) . (1)
The two groups hold conflicting views on public goods provision. When a
group implements its ideal policy, the benefit to the other group is only a frac-
tion (1− γ) of the benefit to the group in power: uj (gi) = (1− γ)ui (gi) = g.
I shall refer to γ as a measure of polarization of political preferences in so-
ciety, or simply “polarization”. Polarization may be based on for instance
ethnic, linguistic, and religious diﬀerences between people. Groups divided
along these lines can be expected to have conflicting views on, say education
policies and the supply of cultural and religious infrastructure and services.
Geographical distance and lack of economic interaction between the diﬀerent
groups would typically increase the degree of conflicting views on public pol-
icy. For instance, investment in the physical infrastructure in region A carries
limited benefits to the group living in region B when economic interaction
between the regions is small.
While the governing group taxes the opposition group as hard as possible,
constrained by, say, eﬃciency considerations and/or bureaucratic capacity,
oil money is at least partly used to oﬀer special favors to members of the
governing group. These favors can take the form of well-paid jobs in the
bureaucracy and various forms of tax cuts and subsidies, privileges that in-
crease the disposable income and thereby the private goods consumption of
the governing group. Let θ define the taxes levied on the opposition group.
When group i is in power in a national union, the objective function of the
government is therefore given by:
UNii = (1− ti) (ti + θ + ρ) , (2)
where ui (gi) = g = ti + θ+ ρ. Maximizing UNii with respect to ti we find
that:
ti =
1
2
(1− θ − ρ) ≡ tN . (3)
The level of θ can of course take any number from zero to unity. As a
useful benchmark, however, let θ = 1
3
. Note that in this case the optimal tax
policy is given by:
tN =
1
3
− 1
2
ρ. (4)
Without oil rents, i.e., for ρ = 0, ta = tb = 13 in a national union. In this
way, oil rents can be seen as introducing to the government an opportunity
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to hand out special privileges to members of its own group, formalized as
lower taxation for this group than for the opposition group. Note that for
ρ > 2
3
, tN < 0: For suﬃciently high rents, the special favors oﬀered to the
members of the governing group exceed their tax obligations, implying that
they are net recipients of transfers from the government. Taxation of group
b, however, is simply given by θ = 1
3
, and thus unaﬀected by the level of
rents. Using (3) in (2) we get:
UNii =
1
4
µ
4
3
+ ρ
¶2
. (5)
For group i living under group j rule in a national union, we have:
UNij =
2
3
µ
2
3
+
1
2
ρ
¶
(1− γ) . (6)
where ui (gj) = g (1− γ) =
¡
tN + θ + ρ
¢
(1− γ) =
¡
2
3
+ 1
2
ρ
¢
(1− γ). In
case of elections, with λi denoting the probability of group i winning the
election, the expected utility of this group is given by:
UEi = λiU
N
ii + (1− λi)UNij . (7)
With elections biased in favor of the stronger group, there probability of
group b winning the election is given by λb ≤ 12 and that of group a by 1−λb.
The lower is λb the more biased is the election in favor of the stronger group.
Under regional autonomy, local governments tax the local land. In addition,
group i controls a share ri of the country’s oil. The level of ri can partly
be explained by the relative distribution of power between the two groups,
and partly by the geographical location of the oil resources between the two
regions. The utility of a representative member of group i, and hence the
objective function of a regional government i, is therefore given by:
URi = (1− ti) (ti + riρ) . (8)
Maximizing URi with respect to ti we get:
ti =
1
2
(1− riρ) ≡ tRi , (9)
which inserted in (8) yields:
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URi =
1
4
(1 + ρri)
2 . (10)
The benefit to group b from establishing regional autonomy is that it
will enable it to implement its preferred fiscal policy. The cost, however, is
that it will be limited by the regional tax base in financing the public goods
provision. In this way, they have to forsake the scale economies present in
public goods supply at the national level, i.e., forsake the peace dividend.
3 Analysis: Political transition, resource rents
and polarization
Assume first that the dominant group a decides not to share political power.
We can then derive the critical level of polarization for which group b is
indiﬀerent between subordinating to the rule of group a in a national union
and seeking regional autonomy as:
UNba = U
R
b ⇒ γ = 1−
(1 + ρrb)
2
4
3
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢ ≡ γ1. (11)
For γ < γ1, UNba > U
R
b and group b is loyal to the dictatorial rule of group
a, whereas if γ > γ1, UNba < U
R
b , group b’s response to dictatorship by a is
secession.
Assume next that group a is willing to share political power. Group b
is indiﬀerent between taking part in national elections and seeking regional
autonomy when:
UEb = U
R
b ⇒ γ = 1−
(1 + ρrb)
2 − λb
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢2
4
3
(1− λb)
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢ ≡ γ2. (12)
We observe that for λb = 0, γ2 = γ1. Clearly, with no chance of winning
the elections, “democracy” is eﬀectively a dictatorship, and the choice be-
tween compliance and exit is the same in the two cases. For λb > 0, γ2 > γ1.
With a positive probability of winning the elections, group b chooses to re-
main in the political union for a higher level of polarization with elections
than without.
Note also that for small levels of ρ, γ2 < 1. This can be seen from the
fact that for ρ = 0, γ2 =
7
16(1−λb) ≤
7
8
, which falls with a reduction in λb.
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Hence, for low levels of resource rents, group b prefers “exit” to “inclusion”
even when the latter is based on perfectly free and fair elections. Any bias
in these elections naturally reduces group b’s willingness to take part in the
union: An increase in λb leads to a negative shift in γ2.
For γ > γ2, UEb < U
R
b , implying that group b prefers regional autonomy
to participating in national elections. For γ < γ2, UEb > U
R
b , and group b
prefers participation in the national elections.
Finally, assume that group b insists on political participation in order
to stay in the union with group a. Group a is indiﬀerent between sharing
power in a national democracy and not sharing power, followed by secession
by group b, when:
UEa = U
R
a ⇒ γ = 1−
(1 + ρ (1− rb))2 − (1− λb)
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢2
4
3
λb
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢ ≡ γ3. (13)
For γ > γ3, UEa < URa , implying that group a prefers not to share political
power even when this leads to group b breaking away from the union. For
γ < γ3, UEa > URa , and group a prefers to oﬀer democratization. In other
words, when rents are low, more precisely, γ < γ3, group a prefers to oﬀer
political participation when this is necessary to prevent group b from seeking
regional autonomy. For higher levels of rent, γ > γ3, the relative importance
of tax income declines, and the dominant group prefers dictatorship, even
when this leads to group b leaving the union.
We know from the discussion so far that: (i) In a relatively homogenous
society, exclusion of the weaker group from the political process does not
necessarily lead to cessation and conflict (i.e., for γ < γ1); (ii) In a more
polarized society, group b may insist on participating in the political process
at the national level in order to remain in the political union with group
a (i.e., for γ > γ1); (iii) If polarization is high and rents low, group b may
choose regional autonomy even if oﬀered democratic participation in national
elections (i.e., for γ > γ2); (iv) Unless rents are too high, the dominant group
may oﬀer political participation in order to prevent group b from breaking
away from the union (i.e., for γ < γ3). (v) If rents are suﬃciently high, the
dominant group may exclude the weaker group from the political process,
even if this leads to cessation and conflict (i.e., for γ > γ3).
The eﬀect of polarization and resource rents on the political equilibrium
depends inter alia on the distribution of resource rents in case of secession,
i.e., rb. The analysis is organized into to scenarios, the first with a “low”
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level of rb and the second with a “high” level of rb.
3.1 Low level of rb
Figure 1 illustrates the case with a low level of rb.6
0
ρ
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
γ
γ2
γ1
1
2
3
Compliance
Exit
Inclusion
γ3 Exclusion
4
γ'
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3
Figure 1: Rent, polarization, and political equilibrium
We observe that for low levels of polarization, there is “compliance” (re-
gion 2). For high levels of polarization and low resource rents there is “exit”
(region 3). For intermediate levels of polarization and not too high resource
rents there is “inclusion” (region 1), while high levels of polarization and high
levels of rent results in “exclusion” (region 4).
6In the figure, λb = 13 , rb = 0.
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To illustrate the potential non-monotonic eﬀect of resource rents on the
political equilibrium in the present model, consider the level of polarization,
γ0 in Figure 1. For low levels of ρ, we are in area 3 characterized by regional
autonomy and therefore conflict, caused by the exit of group b from the
union. An increase in ρ such that we cross the γ2-line takes us into area
1 characterized by inclusion. The eﬀect of resource rents in this case has
been to “grease the machinery of cooperation”: The prospect of controlling
the country’s natural resources, with its associated privileges in terms of
determining public expenditure and supplying various transfers to its group of
supporters, induces group b to give up regional self-rule and enter a peaceful,
democratic competition for political power, even if elections are biased in
favor of the other group.
A further increase in resource rents such that we cross the γ3-line and
enter region 4, however, leads to the exclusion of group b from the political
process, thus triggering regionalism and conflict. In this case, oil has “fuelled
conflict”. The dominant group now prefers to secure the control over its
share of natural resources (which in Figure 1 constitutes all the country’s
resources), even if this leads to the loss of group b’s land from the national
tax base.
Finally, increasing resource rents such that we cross the γ1-line and move
from region 4 to region 2 again changes the political outcome from one of
conflict to peace. But in this case, the peaceful equilibrium is based on
passive compliance rather than active involvement in the political process
(i.e., unlike the transition from region 3 to region 1). The externality from
public goods supply shaped by a very wealthy group a is suﬃciently attractive
to group b to induce them to “lay down their arms” and subordinate to the
rule of the rival group. Hence, oil may “grease the machinery of cooperation”
not only by stimulating power sharing in a national democracy but also by
stimulating passive compliance on the part of the weaker group.
Observe that for lower levels of polarization, the eﬀect of increased re-
source rents on political transition is more likely to be monotonic, changing
the equilibrium from region 1 “inclusion” to region 2 “compliance”. Oil in
this case has “caused political pacification”: As we cross the γ1-curve, group
a realizes that it does not have to oﬀer political participation in order to
prevent exit by group b. As a result, political power is monopolized by a.
This exclusion does not lead to any response by group b, who prefers staying
in the union rather than opting for regional autonomy.
Consider also the implications of the model regarding changes in polar-
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ization for given levels of rent. Interestingly, wee observe that increased
polarization for relatively moderate levels of rent (e.g., ρ1 or ρ2 in Figure
1) may cause a political transition from “compliance” to “inclusion”. In
this way, increased polarization has led to a democratization of society. The
reason for this observation is that increased polarization leads to stronger in-
centives to exit for the weaker group. If resource rents are not too high, the
stronger group’s response to this is to oﬀer political participation in order to
prevent exit. A further increase in polarization, on the other hand, may lead
to secessions and conflict, as we cross the γ2-line and enter region 3 charac-
terized by “exit”. If resource rents are suﬃciently large, on the other hand,
(e.g., for ρ3), the response by the dominant group to increased polarization
is to exclude group b from the political process, leading to a breakup of the
political union. In this way, the model shows that the eﬀect of changes in
polarization, like changes in resource rents, may have highly complex eﬀects
on the political equilibrium.
3.2 High level of rb
Figure 2 illustrates the situation with a high level of rb.7
Compared to Figure 1, we observe that this scenario is less complex, the
reason being that γ3, and hence “exclusion”, does not apply. Intuitively, with
group b controlling a substantial share of the country’s natural resources,
group a is not tempted to do anything that might cause group b to leave the
union, a move which would lead to a substantial erosion of the tax base for
group a.
Again, as in Figure 1, we observe that resource rents may “grease the ma-
chinery of cooperation” by leading to a political transition from region 3 to
1, from “exit” to “inclusion”. This is true for relatively high levels of polar-
ization. A new feature of the present scenario is the potential of oil resources
to change the political outcome from “compliance” to “inclusion”. This is
true for low levels of polarization. Note that in Figure 1, for relatively low
levels of polarization, the potential of oil resources was the reverse, namely
a transition from “inclusion” to “compliance”. Now, with a higher share of
oil rents controlled by group b, group b will be more inclined to seek regional
autonomy as the value of these resources, i.e., ρ, increases. This is captured
by the downward sloping γ1-curve. In order to prevent exit by group b in the
7In Figure 2, λb = 13 , rb =
1
2 .
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Figure 2: Political transition with low rb
face of increased resource revenues, group a oﬀers participation in a national
political process.
4 Case studies
It may be useful to illustrate the relevance of these mechanisms by referring
to some case studies. Sudan is a case where oil appears to have fuelled
conflict. To quote Michael Ross (2003, page 23): “The war in Sudan began in
1983 when Sudanese President Numeiry took a series of measures that upset
the delicate balance between the predominantly Muslim north and Christian
and Animist south; among these measures was his decision to place newly
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discovered oil in the country’s south under the jurisdiction of the north, and
to build an oil refinery in the north instead of the south.” Here, the group
in the north (the dominant group) decides to keep resource rents for itself,
which in turn upsets the delicate balance of cooperation that existed before
the discovery of the oil resources. In Figure 1, this corresponds to a move
from area 1 to 4.
The potential of resource rents to be used by the ruler to pacify the
population politically is widely discussed by Middle East specialists. For in-
stance, Crystal (1990) argues that the discovery of oil in Kuwait and Qatar
enabled the government to buy the support of the merchant classes in these
countries while excluding them from their traditional participation in local
politics. rentier state. Indeed, most oil rich countries in the Middle East
must be characterized as dictatorships, but politically and socially relatively
peaceful and stable ones. This political and social stability is promoted by
various forms of patronage policies to pacify key interests groups in soci-
ety. On these so-called rentier state, see also Anderson (1987) and Beblawi
and Luciani (1987). In Figure 1, the potential of oil revenues to pacify the
opposition is captured by a move from region 1 to 2.
Several case studies point to the potential of resource rents in stimulat-
ing social and political cooperation, i.e., to move the economy from region 3
to 1 in Figure 1. Neuhouser (1992) argues that, by allowing a “class com-
promise” between workers and capitalists, rising oil revenues was key to the
formation and stability of democracy in Venezuela from 1958 an onwards.
Similarly, Karl (1997, page 101) states that: “Petroleum rents underlay this
new system of reconciling competing interests by turning all organized inter-
ests into subsidized clientele and thus permitting them to avoid the zero-sum
economic games that have proved so detrimental to democracy in the rest of
Latin America.”
In a study of the Middle Eastern monarchies, Herb (1999) shows that
before oil, the Gulf monarchies were characterized by a relatively high degree
of regional autonomy, each region led by a prince of the ruling family. Family
ties did not prevent conflict; intrafamily wars often erupted on the death of
a ruler. According to Herb, oil has transformed the states of Arabia from
segmentary to unitary states. It has enabled the ruler to secure allegiances
by bestowing special favors, such as positions in the state bureaucracy, to
influential individuals. Moreover, by increasing the value of power, oil has in
fact stimulated cooperation among the members of the ruling families. This
is due to the fact that the thrown is not necessarily handed over from father
14
to son in the Arabian dynasties. Instead, the future ruler has to receive the
bay’a, a pledge of allegiance, from key members of the ruling family. A large
number of shaykhs and princes are thus eligible to take over power. Rather
than choosing confrontation, the various princes cooperate in the hope of
one day becoming the ruler of the country and thereby controlling its oil
wealth. The indeterminacy of the succession is important for holding the
coalition of royal family members together. In the words of Herb (1999,
pages 45-46): “The dynasties of Arabia do not resolve their disputes because
they are families, bound by ties of aﬀection. In the days before oil, family
bonds did not prevent fratricide, patricide, and other varieties of intrafamily
murder. [. . . ] After oil the indeterminacy of the succession has continued to
provide the glue that holds the family together and guarantees its control of
state power.” Hence, if not producing broad based democratization in the oil
rich Arabia, oil at least appears to have promoted stability and the political
participation of various factions of the ruling families.
5 Endogenous policy
So far we have assumed that a government implements its ideal policy. In
this section we consider the possibility of policy moderation. It may be in the
interest of the dominant group to commit to policies closer to those preferred
by the weaker group in order to prevent this group from breaking away from
the union. Similarly, the weaker group may seek to commit to policies closer
to those preferred by the dominant group, in order to prevent being excluded
from the political process at the national level. Let μi measure the degree
of policy moderation implemented by the governing group i. With modified
policies, the benefit from public spending for the governing group is:
ui (μi) = g (1− γμi) . (14)
Similarly, the benefit from public spending for the group in opposition is
given by:
uj (μi) = g (1− γ (1− μi)) . (15)
Clearly, for μi = 0, there is no policy moderation, and we are back to the
benchmark case of no policy commitment. An increase in μi, ceteris paribus,
reduces the utility of the ruling group and increases that of the opposition.
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A group a dictator may induce compliance from group b by moderating
its policy. The optimal degree of policy moderation is such that group b
is indiﬀerent between staying in the union and breaking away from it (and
therefore chooses to stay). Using (15), and using this to modify (6), the
optimal degree of policy moderation from a group a dictator can be found
from the condition UNba (μa, ) = U
R
b as:
μa = 1−
1
γ
Ã
1− (1 + ρrb)
2
4
3
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢ ! ≡ μ∗a, (16)
which simply means that the absolute level of policy moderation by group
a, i.e., γμ∗a, should equal γ − γ1 (since the expression in the parenthesis of
(16) equals γ1). Note that for γ < γ1, there is no need for the a dictator
to oﬀer any policy moderation in order to induce compliance from b. Hence,
μ∗a > 0 only applies for γ > γ1.
Consider next the case of democracy. For γ > γ2, group a may wish to
moderate its policies in order to prevent exit by group b. The optimal degree
of policy moderation from group a can now be found from the condition
UEb (μa) = U
R
b :
μa = 1−
1
γ
Ã
1 +
λb
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢2 − (1 + ρrb)2
4
3
(1− λb)
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢ ! ≡ μˆa, (17)
which implies that γμˆa = γ − γ2: The eﬀective policy moderation by
group a should be such that group b is indiﬀerent between participation in
the political process at the national level and seeking regional autonomy.
Finally, group b may have an incentive to moderate its policies under
national democracy in order to prevent exclusion. This applies for γ > γ3.
The optimal degree of policy moderation from a group b dictator can now be
found from the condition UEab (μb) = U
R
a :
μb = 1−
1
γ
Ã
1 +
(1− λb)
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢2 − (1 + ρ (1− rb))2
4
3
λb
¡
4
3
+ ρ
¢ ! ≡ μˆb, (18)
so that γμˆb = γ − γ3, making the stronger group indiﬀerent between
excluding the weaker group and including it in the political process. Assume
that there is a limit to the extent to which groups can credibly promise policy
moderation, given by μ¯. Figure 3 shows how the possibility of limited policy
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Figure 3: Policy moderation
commitment aﬀects the political equilibrium relative to the situation shown
in Figure 1, i.e., the scenario with low rb.
Below the γ1-curve, there is no incentive to moderate policy and the
outcome is as in the benchmark version of the model, characterized by com-
pliance. Policy moderation by the dictator extends compliance by areas 2a
(in Figure 1 characterized by “inclusion”) and area 2b (in Figure 1 charac-
terized by “exclusion”). Policy moderation by a increases in γ and falls in
ρ (such that group b stays indiﬀerent between remaining in the union and
exiting. In area 1 there are national elections and no incentive for the parties
to moderate policies. In area 3a, policy moderation by group a results in na-
tional democracy (in Figure 1 characterized by “exit”). The degree of policy
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moderation by group a increases in γ and falls in ρ. In area 4a there is policy
moderation by b in order to prevent being excluded from political participa-
tion, thus changing the political outcome to “inclusion” (where in Figure 1
there was “exclusion”). The degree of policy moderation by b increases in γ
and ρ. The present scenario thus demonstrates that changes in ρ and γ may
aﬀect not only political institutions, i.e., the choice between democracy or
dictatorship, but also economic policy, i.e., the degree to which policies are
polarized or more moderate.
6 Conclusion
Resource rents may have a complex eﬀect on political and economic out-
comes. The possibility of such resources representing a curse for political
and economic outcomes has received a lot of attention in the recent litera-
ture. However, it is clearly not the case that such resources necessarily are
bad for countries. Focusing on the interaction between resource rents and
polarization of preferences on public policy, the present analysis has analyzed
the circumstances under which resource rents are likely to promote political
divisions in society, and when such resources may stimulate political cooper-
ation. Moreover, the model has shown how resource rents and polarization
may shape economic policies.
Increased resource rents may “grease the machinery of cooperation” by
making it more attractive to influence national policies, and thereby induce
the politically weaker group to take part in national elections rather than
seek regional autonomy, even if the national elections are biased in favor of
the stronger, incumbent group. Increased resource rents may also “grease the
machinery of cooperation” by making the opposition group more inclined to
“surrender” to the dictatorial rule of the stronger group, at least if polar-
ization in society is fairly low making the positive externalities from public
goods provision suﬃciently high.
Increased resource rents may “fuel conflict” by reducing the importance
of tax revenues relative to resource rents as a source of government income.
Increased resource rents may thus make it tempting to monopolize political
decision making. If polarization is high, the response to the exclusion of the
weaker group from national decision making is likely to be secession from the
union, thus leading to conflict.
Finally, increased resource rents may “cause political pacification”. This
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is true for relatively low levels of polarization, where increased resource rents
may reduce the need for the dominant group to share power in order to induce
loyalty by the weaker group. With increased rents, political power can be
monopolized without triggering exit by the weaker group. In equilibrium,
therefore, this may cause a transition from democracy to dictatorship. This
transition, however, is not accompanied by social unrest, as the weaker group
prefers staying in the union rather than seeking regional autonomy.
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